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Faculty and Deans

FOURTH Al.VIENDMENT ISSUES IN
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
Kathryn R. Urbonya*
Honorable George C. Pratt:
The next item on the program is Professor Urbonya who is
going to discuss Fourth Amendment Supreme Court
developments.

Professor Kathryn R. Urbonya:
Good morning. How many of you work in the Fourth
Amendment area? How many of you are familiar with the "Whren
v. United States 1 decision regarding traffic stops? To begin, I want
to give you a brief road map that will explain where I am going.
First, I will discuss the 1996 "Whren case, because it is a very
important case in Fourth Amendment litigation for what it has to
say about reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Second, I
will discuss three cases pending in the Supreme Court that deal with
Fourth Amendment issues which I think will be very important for
civil rights litigation. lastly, I will discuss an area that New
Yorkers have been reading about in the newspapers. This area
consists of the "knock and announce" decisions from the Supreme
Court which I think are just another fonn of excessive force
litigation.
The Whren case is an incredibly important case in a number of
respects. You just listened to a discussion on equal protection and
how difficult it is to prove an equal protection violation. In "Whren,
motorists wanted to challenge their traffic stop by arguing that they
were not stopped for a traffic offense, although, they said, the
driver did commit a traffic offense. 2 They argued that they were
stopped because of their skin color and that the police officers
*Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law.
I 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
2
/d. at 813.
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really acted in a pretextual manner. 3 The Supreme Court made it
very clear in 'Mzren, that if you have a racial challenge, do not use
the Fourth Amendment, use the Equal Protection Clause. 4 You just
listened to how difficult it is to prove an equal protection violation,
but that I think this is an incredibly important part of the decision.
What does it mean for Fourth Amendment analysis?
Basically, the Supreme Court stated in 'Mzren, it was not going to
engage in a reasonableness analysis in this context. 5 I always
thought reasonableness was something we considered under the
Fourth Amendment: we have a reasonableness clause. The Court
explained that in a Fourth Amendment case, when probable cause is
present, that "probable" means that the challenged actions were
"reasonable" and the officers acted in a reasonable manner. This is
the reason my written materials divide the doctrine into areas where
the police officers have probable cause and areas where the police
officers do not have probable cause. 6 The Supreme Court noted
that if an officer conducts a search or seizure without probable
cause, then we may consider pretextual analysis. 7
In addition, the Court explained, where there is probable cause,
only in extraordinary circumstances will it evaluate reasonableness
because the presence of probable cause itself generally signifies that
the challenged action was reasonable. The Court articulated four of
these extraordinary areas where, even though probable cause is
present, we still engage in a reasonableness analysis. 8
First, this reasonableness inquiry was present in Tennessee v.
Garner, 9 a case dealing with deadly force. I think that that would

3

!d. at 814.
Id. at 813.
5
Id. at 814-15.
6
Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fourth Amendment: Selective Supreme Court
Developments, 14 NO.2 PRACI'ICING LAW INSTITUTE, 14TH ANNUAL SECI'ION
1983 CIVIL RIGHfS LmGATION 59 (1998).
7
Whren, 517 U.S. at 817.
8
ld.
9
/d. at 818 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
4
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include Graham, 10 the nondeadly force cases as well. The Court
created balancing tests. 11
The second, the next extraordinary area involves "unannounced
entries" and the "knock and announce" requirement. 12 This
situation occurs when a police officer goes into someone's home
without a warrant, and without knocking. 13 This would constitute
an extraordinary circumstance where the Court separately evaluates
reasonableness.
The third area is when an officer goes into a home saying that he
or she has probable cause and extraordinary circumstances. This
situation existed in Welsh v. "Wisconsin. 14 There, the Court held
that the home is an area of traditional protection and we will
consider a reasonableness analysis as well. 15
The fourth area involves the case of "Winston v. Lee, 16 which dealt
with the question of reasonableness: even if there is probable cause
to believe that a bullet in a person's body is evidence of a crime,
and even if a magistrate would authorize the removal of it, it does
not necessarily mean that it is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment surgically removing the bullet. This is because
of the risk associated with surgery. The government has so much
evidence anyway that it does not need the bullet; so in those
contexts, the Supreme Court states, when there is probable cause
you have to have an extraordinary circumstance to consider whether
the conduct was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. I think that is an important qualification. I have
always thought reasonableness was an aspect of all that.
Where does Whren take us? It takes us to some of the pending
cases in the Supreme Court, and some decided cases. Wlzren holds
that if a traffic offense is committed, a police officer can lawfully
stop the car. 17 The Court said that it was not going to decide
490 u.s. 386 (1989).
ld. at 395-96.
12
Id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).
13
See id.
14
466"Q.S. 740 (1984).
IS Jd. at 748-50.
16
470 u.s. 753 (1985).
17
Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
10

11
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whether the officers acted in a pretextual manner. 18
Next,
19
Maryland v. Wilson came up and asked whether a police officer
can order a passenger outside a car. 20 The Supreme Court had
previously decided, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,Z 1 that once the
driver of a car is lawfully stopped for a traffic offense within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the driver could be ordered
outside the car. 22 The interesting aspect of Mimms was that the
Supreme Court did not determine whether there was a seizure, and
whether it was reasonable under the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 23 The Court stated that this invasion was de minimus,
do not worry about it, you are already lawfully stopped and in the
name of police safety we are going to allow the police officer to
order the driver outside the car. 24
The Supreme Court in Maryland v. lWlson used the same kind of
analysis and said, "what is good for the driver is good for the
passenger. " 25 Thus, the Supreme Court noted that it was going to
go ahead and allow the police officer to have the authority to order
a passenger out of the car in order to protect officer safety. 26
In any event, once the officer orders a passenger outside the car,
what else can the officer do with the passenger? In Wilson, there
was oral argument and discussion about whether a passenger can be
put in a cruiser, et cetera. 27 The Supreme Court explained in a
footnote that all that was being decided was that the officer had the
authority to order the passenger out. It was not deciding whether
the officer could detain a passenger during the seizure of the
driver. 28

18

19
20

21

22
23

24
25
26

ZT
28

!d. at 817.
117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
ld. at 884.
434 u.s. 106 (1977).
ld. at 111.
Id.
ld.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
ld.
Id. at 886 n 3.
!d.
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There are already lower court decisions holding that an officer can
go ahead and order a passenger to stay because the officer has to be
able to watch the passenger's movement.29 The reason for this,
according to the lower courts, is because the purpose of ordering a
passenger out of the car is officer safety, an officer should be able
to watch the passenger to know what the passenger is doing. 30
Others argue the contrary position, saying that the passenger has
not committed any crime, that he is just present in the car and as a
result, the passenger should be free to walk away. 31 Also, it may
be safer for the officer to get rid of one person on the scene. 32 So
there is going to be litigation about the passenger as well.
We have had prior' cases dealing with police officers ordering
passengers to lie down on the ground and separating them. 33 It is
all going to be the question of how we look at this particular act of
ordering the passenger out of the car. For the most part,
passengers have sat in the front seat or back seat unless there are
lots of passengers in the car and the officer orders back up before
he or she deals with the passengers.
Now we have the car stopped for a traffic offense. Professor
Chemerinsky thought that ordering a person out of the car during a
traffic offense stop was just outrageous because police officers are
going to be able to stop all of us. People commit traffic offenses
every day. I thought about my five minute drive to school, and
decided Professor Chemerinsky is right. I commit three traffic
offenses just driving to school in five minutes. Putting that aside,
we are all going to become better drivers after the Wlzren decision.
29

See. e.g.• N.Y. v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773, 543 N.E.2d 733, 545
N.Y.S.2d 90 (1989) (holding that a passenger may be ordered to exit a
lawfully stopped motor vehicle for the safety of the officers); N.Y. v.
McLaurin, 70 N.Y.2d 779, 515 N.E.2d 904, 521 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1987)
(holding that a de minimis intrusion upon the passenger's liberty was
acceptable to protect officer safety).
30 McLaurin, 10 N.Y.2d at 780, 515 N.E.2d at 905, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 219;
see also People v. Gonzalez, 184 lll.2d 402, 704 N.E.2d 375, 235 Dl. Dec.
626 (1998) ( collecting cases).
31
People v. Gonzalez, 184 lli.2d 402; 704 N.E.2d 375, 235 Ill. Dec. 26
(1998) (Heiple, J., dissenting).
32
!d. (Heiple, J. dissenting)
33
Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991).
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We also have Ohio 'V. Robinette. 34 Robinette involved the
situation where, once one is lawfully stopped for a traffic offense
and the officer is nice and gives a warning because of speeding, but
then says, here is my warning, but before you leave, do you mind if
I search your car? The issue before the Supreme Court in Robinette
was whether the officer must tell the driver, hey, you are free to
go, it is all over, I am just having a friendly encounter with you and
you are free to leave?35 What way do you think the Supreme Court
held? The Supreme Court held that the officer does not have the
duty to tell a person that the traffic stop is over and a friendly
encounter is now taking place. 36 So under the "consent doctrine," 37
established in Sclmeckloth, 38 the police officer does not have a duty
to tell a person that she has a right to refuse the officer's request,
and now under Ohio v. Robinette, the officer does not have a duty
to tell a person that a traffic stop is over and she is free to go. The
officer is just asking in a friendly manner, whether he can search
her car. 39
The Supreme Court explained it does not like bright lines and it
wanted to have the question about seizures open-ended. 40
However, in Robinette, the Supreme Court held that the officer can
go ahead and ask that question and we will determine whether,
looking at the circumstances, the person was seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 41
A very important case in the Supreme Court dealing once again
with traffic stops is Knowles v. Iowcf2 which makes the question of
consent irrelevant. The facts of Knowles are that a police officer

34

117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
Id. at 421.
36 ld.
37
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent
be voluntary, which "is a question of fact to be determined from all of the
circumstances.").
3s Id.
39
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
40
Id.
41 Id.
42
119 S. Ct. 484 (1998).
35
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stopped someone for a typical traffic offense. 43 The police officer
walked up to the driver, asked him for identification and
registration, went back to the cruiser, saw there was no problem,
then went back to the driver and said that he was going to search
the driver's car. 44 What happened to the consent?
Next, the officer issued the individual a citation and searched the
car. 45 We know from prior Fourth Amendment law that a police
officer can search a car if the search is incident to an arrest. 46 Why
incident to an arrest? The idea is to further officer safety, to guard
against the destruction of evidence, and to be able to search the
area in the immediate control of the defendant. 47 In Knowles the
individual was not arrested; he was just issued a traffic citation. 48
The police officer was acting pursuant to an Iowa statute that said
when issuing a citation, the officer has the authority to go ahead
and search the area of the person as long as the officer has the
authority to arrest the individual. ~ 9
When I researched this case, I called to get the briefs. I talked to
someone who works for the state but whose name I will not
mention. This person told me that although the statute had been on
the books since 1983, litigation involving its application had first
surfaced this year. This person told me that the reason for this was
that attorneys for the State think the statute is unconstitutional, so
officers were trained not to search vehicles when issuing traffic
violations. The officer in Knowles did search and now the State has
to defend the statute. 50
The issue is whether the officer had the authority to search
incident to the citation. 51 The defendant did not challenge the
officer's authority to arrest him for a traffic citation. 52 Therefore,
43

44

45

Id. at 486.
Id.

ld.
See U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
47
Id. at 225-26.
48
Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 486.
49
Id. at 486-87.
so Id. at 487.
Sl Jd.
sz Id.
46
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the assumption was that the officer could arrest this individual.
Since he could arrest him, was the search lawful?
The
government's brief indicated that twenty-six states authorize police
officers to arrest individuals for traffic offenses and sixteen others
have minor restraints. 53 Therefore, the majority of state courts do
allow police officers to make arrests for traffic violations.
What was the argument in this case? The government read Whren
and said we do not worry about searching cars in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner because we had probable cause to stop. 54
Since we had probable cause to stop you, that means we were not
acting in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner and, therefore, we
should be able to do the search. ss The government also stated it
was protecting the individual's privacy, and that there was no
arrest; there was just a search of the car, something that is also
good for the individual. 56 The government explained that officers
are safer in searching the car incident to a traffic citation. 51
Lastly, the government argued that the statute preserves
evidence. 58 Preserve evidence, what evidence is there to preserve?
Asking for identification makes sure you really are who you say
you are and searching the car confinns you are actually the person
you say you are. 59 So the government relied on Whren, to show
that the officer was not acting in a discriminatory manner. Since
there was probable cause, the officer had the authority to arrest
under state law. Therefore, the search was lawful. 60
The criminal defendant in Knowles v. Iowa argued that he was not
arrested and the search incident to arrest doctrine is built upon the
notion of being in custody. Thus that is the reason the officer gets
to search the area of immediate control; the defendant, when
arrested, is in the officer's custody on the way to the station. 61
53

1998 WL 541975 (U.S. Iowa Resp. Brief).
Id.
55 Id.
56 !d.
S7 !d.
.ss !d.
59 !d.
60 !d.
61 !d.

54
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Further, the defendant argued, when someone receives a traffic
citation, there is no real threat to the officer, so a search of the car
should not be allowed. If the officer were, in fact, in danger, then
the Terry v. Ohio62 doctrine should worlc. 63
The Terry doctrine states that if an officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe that a person possesses a weapon, the officer
can do a pat-down. 64 I would be happy to predict how the Supreme
Court would decide that issue, but I tried to predict how the
Supreme Court would decide Clinton v. Jones65 and I was wrong.
I think this is an easy case since I agree with the attorneys from
Iowa that the statute is unconstitutional, but one never lmows. So,
this could be a blockbuster case. The authority to stop a driver is
easy to obtain. But authority to search a car should not apply in
this case.
That aside, there is another case dealing with traffic stops in the
Supreme Court. Even if Iowa loses this case, there is another good
case lying ahead. The ease is lVyoming v. Houghton. 66
In Houghton, once again, individuals were stopped for speeding
and the car's brake lights were out. 67 The police officer walked up
to the car and noticed a male driver and two female passengers. 63
As he approached the driver, he saw a syringe in his pocket and
went back to the cruiser to get some gloves in order to protect
himself. 69
He then went back to the car and talked to the driver and asked
what the syringe was for and the driver responded that it was for
drugs. 70 That is what the driver said. In this case, one of the
392 u.s. 1 (1968).
Knowles, 119 S.Ct. at 488.
M Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
65
117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997). In this case the Court held that the President does
not have immunity from civil litigation arising out of events prior to his taking
office, nor does separation of powers require the Court to avoid prosecution
until after he leaves office. ld.
66
119 S. Ct. 31 (1998); see also Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 3b3 (Wyo.
1998).
01
Houghton, 956 P.2d at 365.
62

63

6S
69

70

Id.
Id.
Id.
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passengers, who ultimately became a criminal defendant, did not
challenge whether the infonnation obtained by the officer amounted
to probable cause that there were drugs in the car. 71
Under prior Supreme Court case law, if an officer had probable
cause to believe that there were drugs in a car, the officer, without
a warrant, could go ahead and search the area as long as a
magistrate would have issued a warrant based on the facts
presented. 72 So the officer's theory of the case was, since there was
probable cause to believe there were drugs in the car, he had the
authority to search the whole car. 73 The passenger argued that all
of the facts of the case must be looked at. 74 Everyone was ordered
out of the car at the point the defendant said that the syringe was for
his drugs, and the officer did a pat-down of all of them. 75 How
often are pat downs done when there is no reasonable suspicion?
The Wyoming Supreme Court said the officer should not have done
the Terry frisks because the officer had no reason to believe the
potential defendants were armed and dangerous. 76 That is all the
court said and no more, that it was an impennissible frisk. 77
When the passengers were outside of the car, the officer asked the
individuals who they were and the one woman passenger said that
her name was Sandra Jones and that she did not have any
identification. 78 In response to this, the officer walked up to the
car, looked inside the car and saw a purse lying in the front. 79 The
police officer opened the purse, pulled out an ID, which the officer
read, and it read Sara Houghton not Sara Jones. 80 At that point, the
woman said that the purse was hers. 81

71

ld. at 366.
ld. See also U.S. v Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
73
Houghton, 956 P.2d at 366.
74 Id.
15
ld. at 365.
76
!d. at 372.
72

77

/d.

78

/d. at 365.

/d.
so /d.
81 !d.

19
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The basis of her challenge in the Supreme Court was that once she
said that the purse was hers, the police officer did not have the
authority to be able to search the purse for drugs. 82 Essentially, she
said that the officer should have stopped, instead of continuing to
search the purse and finding the drugs. 83
The lower courts, according to the Wyoming Supreme Court and
Professor Lafave, have applied three different tests to detennine
whether the officer could search that purse. 84 The first is the
physical relationship test which asks how close the person was to
the particular object at the time of the search. 85 The Wyoming
Supreme Court noted that the physical relationship test was silly
because many people leave their valuables someplace else. 86 The
court said, if you are ordered outside of the car, do you take your
purse, your briefcase, your wallet with you, and where do you have
it. The court said that it was not going to use that as a test. 87
The other test is the relationship test which asks is it in fact, your
purse, your wallet, your briefcase?88 The Wyoming Supreme Court
said that it is just too difficult for a police officer to know whether
an item belongs to a particular individual so the court rejected the
relationship test. 89
The Wyoming court decided to adopt a third test called the notice
test. 90 The notice test asks whether the officer had notice that the
object belonged to somebody else and that they had no authority to
search unless the somebody else could have had access to that
particular belonging. 91 What is interesting about this particular case
is that there was another police officer who was watching the
passengers and the driver to make sure that there was no movement
82
83
84

Id. at 366.
Id

ld. at367. Seegenerally2 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,§

4.10 (b) (3rd eel. 1996).
85
Houghton, 956 P.2d at 367-68.
86
Id. at 368.
'61 Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 369.
'XJ Id.
91

ld.

1634

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[VoltS

going on. 92 This is done because police officers are worried about
hand movement and reaching for objects on the floor. In this case,
there were no allegations that the drugs had moved from the driver
over to the passenger's purse and so the Wyoming Supreme Court
said that because of that, the drugs should be suppressed.
That is the issue up for the Supreme Court and in a nutshell, the
question is whether the officer had the authority to search the
passenger's purse when she identified it as her own. Therefore,
either we will get to see what the Court has to say about searching a
car generally in Knowles v. Iowa, 93 or searching of a particular
object in this case.
The third case in the Supreme Court was Minnesota v. Carter. 94
This is another important case because it deals with the question of
· standing, which the Supreme Court does not like, and the question
of reasonable expectation of privacy. 95 The question about whether
there is standing to challenge something, according to the Supreme
Court, is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy which
has been violated. 96 That in turn asks whether there is actually a
Fourth Amendment violation, not an actual violation, but whether
there is an interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 97

92

Id at 365.
119 S. Ct. 484 (1998).
94
119 S. Ct. 469 (1998).
95
/d. at 474-73.
96
Id. at 474 (concluding that "respondents had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the apartment.").
97
Id. (concluding that "any search which may have occurred did not violate
their Fourth Amendment rights."). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). In this case, petitioners were passengers in a car stopped by police
after receiving a robbery report. Upon search of the car, the police found rifle
shells in the glove box and a shot gun under the front seat. These items were
later admitted into evidence against them at trial. The petitioners argued that
this was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist disagreed and held the fact that the petitioners "were
'legitimately on [the] premises' in the sense that they were in the car with the
permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched." Id.
at 148.
93
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In Miruzesota v. Carter, there were individuals in an apartment
where the blinds were not pulled down very well. 93 These
individuals were wrapping white powder in baggies. 99 A police
officer had received a tip about someone seeing these three people
putting white powder in bags, so he went to the apartment
complex. 100 The record is very unclear as to exactly where the
officer was standing, but the way it was litigated was that the
officer was standing in a public place. 101 Why is that an issue? It is
an issue because the question is whether the officer was on the
curtilage when he was standing right up against the window and
looking through the cracks. The court characterized it as if he were
standing in a public place, looking through the cracks in the
blinds. 102 The defendants in this case were not the homeowners but
were the homeowner's friends who were engaging in the criminal
activity with the homeowner. 103
The question is, when the officer looked through the blinds, did
he violate the homeowner's friend's reasonable expectation of
privacy?104 It is an important case because many years ago the
Supreme Court put some clarity in this area in Miruzesota v.
Olson. 105

The question in Olson dealt with an overnight guest in
somebody's home and whether the guest had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in another's home. 105 The Minnesota
Supreme Court looked at the government's twelve factor test which
determined whether the guest had a sufficient connection to the
place in order to determine whether the guest had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court drew a bright line, and said that if one is an
overnight guest, that person has a reasonable expectation of
98

Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 471.
Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id
103
Id. at 472.
104 Id.
105
495 u.s. 91 (1990).
106
Id. at 93.

99
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privacy. 107 However, in Mirmesota v. Carter, the case pending
before the Supreme Court, the defendants were not overnight
guests; they were there for a few hours and engaging in criminal
activity. 108 The American Civil Liberties Union (" ACLU") in its
amicus brief discussed morality. 109 The ACLU asked, when trying
to look at whether these individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in another person's apartment, should there be a rule
where the Fourth Amendment gives protection to someone engaged
in illicit sexual activity, who stays over night, but not to the person
who actually has sex during the afternoon and leaves, so that one
would actually have to stay over night in order to have an
expectation of privacy? 110
I have no idea which way the Court will hold in this situation.
We may revisit the proposed twelve factor test or maybe the Court
will say that because the defendants were engaged in a brief,
criminal enterprise, they do not have an expectation of privacy. So
those are important cases concerning the definition of what a
search is, and if there were a reasonable expectation of privacy,
then the Court will also talk about the officer's authority to peek
through the blinds.
There are three extraordinary cases which the Supreme Court has
discussed the Whren case concerning the issue of "knock and
announce." The three important "knock and announce" cases in
this area are "Wilson v. Arkansas, 111 Richards v. Wisconsin112 and

United States v. Ramirez. 113
The first two cases deal with actions by state officials and the third
deals with federal officials. Why is this important? It is important
because in the final case, Ramirez, the Supreme Court made a very
important announcement saying that the federal "knock and
announce" statute really just represents the common law "lrnock
and announce" principle that is embodied in the Fourth
107

!d. at 100.
Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 472.
109
1998 WL 310723 (U.S. Amicus Brief).
110 !d.
111
514 U.S. 927 (1995). See also 317 Ark. 548, 878 S. W.2d 755 (1994).
112
117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
113
118 S. Ct. 992 (1998).
108
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Amendment. 114 So this ties the federal "!mock and announce"
statute to the Fourth Amendment How does it do so?
First of all, in Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court laid the foundation
for saying that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the "knock and
announce" common law requirement, that an officer, before
executing a search warrant to come into a home, has to "knock and
announce," revealing the officer's presence and pu:rpose.ns
The reasons for this rule are obvious. It is like classic excessive
force litigation in some sense. It is the idea that, first, if we "knock
and announce," we will not have to break down a door, and
second, it is a little safer for police officers to say that the person
walking through the door right now is a police officer, not some
stranger, because if presence is not announced, there might be an
unwanted forceful response by the occupant Third, it is designed
to protect the privacy of an individual in these situations. So all the
Court did in Wilson v. Arkansas was hold that when looking at the
Fourth Amendment, it does incorporate the common law rule of
knocking and announcing one's pu1pose and presence.
Next comes Richards v. Wisconsin, 116 a 1996 case that dealt with
the question of no knock warrants when looking for drugs in a
house. 117 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in this case, held that if
the reason law enforcement officials want to execute the search
warrant is to search for drugs, they are automatically going to be
able to enter a home without knocking and announcing their
presence. 118 The Wisconsin Supreme Court rationalized this by
stating that drugs are dangerous and usually drugs go with guns. 119
Well, Richards went up to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court held that just because the police have a search warrant for
drugs, it does not mean that they can forego the "knock and
announce" requirement in every single case. 120 The Court held that
114

ld. at 997-98.
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934-35.
116
520 U.S. 385 (1997). See also 201 Wis.2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218
(1996).
117
ld. at 388.
118
ld. at 387-88.
119
Id. at 388-89.
120
520 u.s. 385 (1997).
115
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that kind of generalization can be a slippery slope: if no-knock
enters apply to searches for drugs, than what stops such entries in
other cases? 121
So the Court in Richards reaffinned the
reasonableness principle that says one always has to look at the
particular facts of the case to detennine what constitutes a
"reasonable" manner.
The interesting part of this case is that the officers involved in the
case had asked a magistrate to give them a no-knock warrant which
would have given them the ability to just walk right in and the
magistrate refused. 122 The Supreme Court explained that what has
to be looked at are the particular circumstances at the time the
officers executed the warrant. 123 It created a new rule. 124
The Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, even though
the magistrate refused to grant the no-knock warrant, an officer can
enter the home if he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe one
of three things. First, when evidence is about to be destroyed in a
particular case. 125 Second, when it is dangerous to the officer, 126
and third, when it is futile for the officer to knock and announce his
or her presence. 127 Therefore, if the officer has reasonable
suspicion concerning one of these three things then the officer can
forego the knocking and announcing as he or she enters the
particular home.
How did this apply in the Richards case? Well, the magistrate
had been asked to give a no-knock warrant for a search that
ultimately occurred at 3:40 in the morning in a hotel room. 128 A
bunch of police officers went to the hotel room with only one of
them dressed in uniform. 129 The police knocked on the door and
one officer announced himself as the maintenance man. 130 When
121
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the defendant opened the door with the chain on, be expected to see
a maintenance man, but instead be saw a unifonned officer
instead. 131 This fact becomes important since the defendant
acknowledged having seen a uniformed officer, be acknowledged
the officer's presence. Next, the defendant slammed the door and
the police officers contemporaneously announced their presence and
purpose as they broke open the door. 132
The Supreme Court held that under this set of circumstances, the
officers bad reasonable suspicion. 133 The Court did not particularly
identify what the exact circumstances here were, but I assume the
destruction of evidence, the futility and the fact that the criminal
defendant bad recognized the police officer demonstrates that the
defendant obviously knew about their presence. Therefore, what
the Court did in Richards was bold that first, there can be no
blanket rule concerning "knock and announce" cases for drugs, and
second, if a police officer bas reasonable suspicion as to one of the
three circumstances, the officer can forego the "Irnock and
announce" requirement that the Court recognized in Wilson. 134
The third case was United States v. Ramirez. 135 In Ramirez, the
police officers believed they were searching for a very dangerous
person. The person they were looking for bad threatened to torture
individuals, claimed be would not do federal time, and that he was
going to get away with this at all costs. 136 The police believed this
individual was in a third party's home and, as a result, they went to
the third party's home early in the morning with a loud speaker. 137
The police announced who they were while simultaneously
breaking open a window with a gun. 138 The individual inside the
bouse heard the window breaking and thought there was a burglary
going on, shot at the garage ceiling in order to try and scare off the
burglar, and at that point, be received a response from the police
ld.
132 ld.
133
Id. at 395.
134
Id. at 396.
135
Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. 992 (1998).
136
ld. at 995.
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officers. 139 The police officers entered the home and discovered
some guns which the defendant was not supposed to have since he
is a felon. 140 The question was, can the officers really go into the
house under such circumstances?141
The Supreme Court held that the federal "knock and announce"
statute really incorporates the common law principle that in certain
circumstances the police officers do not have to wait a certain
amount of time to hear from the individual in order to go into the
house. 142 The Court held that, in this situation, the police officers
had reasonable suspicion as articulated in the Richards decision. 143
What does this mean for Section 1983 litigation144 and criminal
litigation? The first question is how long do police officers have to
wait if they are not using the no-knock provision articulated in
Richards? It is not very clear. Professor Lafave, in his treatise,
states that the courts have not required police officers to wait very
long before entering. 145 Generally, courts have required the police
to wait ten to twenty seconds before entering. 146
More recent cases from the federal circuits are less generous than
ten to twenty seconds and many cases state that five seconds is
probably going to be okay. 147 However, the courts have refused to
create a bright-line rule as to what would be a reasonable amount of
time to wait, saying it is necessary to look at the circumstances. 148
For example, in United States v. Knapp, 149 the question was, if you
know the person inside is an amputee, how long do you have to
wait, twelve seconds? 150 According to the court, twelve seconds is
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enough because the amputee does not have to go to the door, the
person just had to say that they lmow the police are present 151
Another issue concerns what is meant by an announcement. One
court has held that mumbling does not count as an announcement
because if people near you can not hear you, then the person inside
can not. 152 Also, the court stated that in terms of what is an
announcement, one does not have to believe that a defendant heard
the announcement, because it is not a subjective test. 153 In one
case, the residents surrounding a particular home heard the bull
hom and the announcements and they ran outside. The court held
that since the residents in the area heard the sound, then an
assumption can be made that the defendant, who was inside the
home, also heard the announcement. 154
Another issue concerns how many doors have to be knocked at?
The Seventh Circuit says only one and you can go and coordinate
your entry at the same time. 155
What does this mean for Section 1983 litigation? Well, the way it
stands right now is that some courts have said that until 1995 with
the decision in Wilson v. Arkansas, the law of knocking and
announcing was not clearly established. If the conduct being
looked at occurred prior to 1995, there is circuit court authority
saying the law was not sufficiently clear. 1515 These are hard cases in
some ways, because what is really being looked at is the question of
reasonable suspicion concerning the circumstances at the time.
This creates fact questions of how close a particular case is to
another case so that the court could say the officers should have
known in this particular case that what they were doing violated the
constitution.
However, there are cases that talk more about the manner of
arrest and I believe that we are going have more cases in this area.
For example, the New York Times highlighted the problem of
lSI
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using a battering ram. I have found only one case that requires
prior judicial authorization before using a battering ram. 157
The Supreme Court case law says that it is not a question of what
the magistrate authorizes; it is the question of whether it was
reasonable under the particular circumstances. Police officers
sometimes use flash bangs, which can cause severe injury. Police
officers have toned down some of the devices that are used to avoid
serious injuries. 158 This is like excessive force litigation, but in the
home context. That is, did the police officers act in a reasonable
manner? We know that it is actually a question because Whren told
us that when the police enter a house without knocking and
announcing, the manner is something we can look at under the
Fourth Amendment. So I think we are going to see more of this
type of litigation when, and if, this happens in a home where the
police either have the wrong house or there really are no drugs.
In summary, I have been reading International Association of
Chief of Police materials. One of its journals states, if officers
really want to invite litigation, just go ahead and have a no knock
entry." 159 Thank you.
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